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Straub: Conflict of Laws--Interspousal Tort Immunity

CASE COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Interspousal Tort Immunity
1', husband of D, sued D for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident in which P was a passenger in a car owned and driven by
D. Both P and D we domiciled in Massachusetts. The accident
occurred in New Hampshire, the forum in this action. The court
was confronted with the problem of whether a spouse's domicile is
controlling for choice of law as to interspousal immunity for tort,
regardless of whether the law of the domicile grants or denies immunity. Held, yes. Common sense and justice combined to dictate
a departure from the place of wrong rule. The interspousal law of
Massachusetts has such a significant relationship to the issue in
dispute as to overcome the preference ordinarily had for the application of New Hampshire law to determine the rights of persons
injured on New Hampshire highways. Therefore, P is denied recovery from D in accordance with Massachusetts law. Johnson v.
Johnson, 216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966).
A pronounced split of authority has developed in the last decade
in the conflict of laws situation presented by the principal case.
Courts must decide whether the law of the domiciliary state or that
of the state in which the tort took place should control with regard
to interspousal actions. The court in principal case took the position
that the law of the state in which the couple is domiciled should
control. An Illinois decision rendered recently with regard to a
similar factual situation held likewise, Wartell v. Forrusa, 213
N.E.2d 544 (Ill. 1966), while a Connecticut court held that the
law of the state in which the tort occurred determines the rights
of spouses to sue one another. Landers v. Landers, 216 A.2d 183
(Conn. 1966).
To understand the present day divergence of decisions a look
at the history of the law in this area is necessary. At common law
the wife's personal and property rights, the very legal existence of
the wife, were regarded as suspended throughout the duration
of the marriage. Husband and wife were regarded as one person,
and it was impossible to maintain a tort action between them.
PnossEn, TORTS, § 116 (3d ed. 1964).
In the United States statutes known as Married Women's Acts
have been enacted in every jurisdiction. These statutes are designed
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to secure to a married woman separate legal identity. The result
has been to free the wife of the husband's control of her property,
and the courts generally agree that they enable her to maintain
an action against her husband for any tort he committed against
her property interests. 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 397, 399 (1954). However, less than half the jurisdictions in the United States allow an
action for any personal tort between spouses, including actions for
injuries resulting from negligence. Kleinfelter, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsylvania-A Concept in Evolution, 69 DicK. L. Rlv.
143 (1964). Only nineteen states have construed the Married
Women's Acts to authorize an action by either spouse for a personal tort committed by the other spouse, intentional or negligent.
West Virginia has not. PROSSER, supra at 880.
In the past this divergence of the law presented no problem because courts generally applied the rule of lex loci delicti to choice
of law problems in tort cases. Note, 19 ARK. L. REv. 168 (1965).
The BESTATEMEN, Co~rtcr OF LAws § 378 (1934) provides that
the law of the place of the wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury. The application of lex loci delicti was to
eliminate uncertainty in the choice of law programs. 4 WAsnBuRN
L. J. 277 (1965). However, with regard to procedural questions the
law of the forum controls. 19 ARK. L. REv., supra.

With regard to tort actions, until 1955 the courts unanimously
held that the effect of the family relationship between parties or
the right to maintain an action was a matter to be determined
by the law of the same jurisdiction referred to by the forum in
order to determine the substantive existence of the cause of action
aside from family relations. Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 973 (1964). In
Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955),
the court stated that the right of the wife to sue her husband involved a matter of substance and that the creation and extent of
liability in tort were fixed by the lex loci delicti commissi. This
case involved a situation in which the situs of the tort forbade intrafamilial actions and the place of the domicile did not. In
Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941), the court also
followed the traditional viewpoint that the family relationship of
the parties was one of the substantive factors going to the existence
of the cause of action.
The trend away from the "place of injury rule" began with
Emery v. Emery, 4 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955). Here the ques-
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tion arose as to whether to apply the law of the domicile state or
the state in which the tort took place in determining whether an
injured child could maintain an action against his parents. The
court held that the domiciliary state has the primary responsibility
for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family relationship. The court also stated that it is undesirable that the rights,
immunities, duties and disabilities conferred or imposed by the
family relationship should constantly change as members of the
family cross state boundaries temporarily. Pennsylvania followed
this decision two years later in deciding that the domestic law of
Pennsylvania determines a widow's capacity to sue her husband in
a personal injury action based on a tort which occurred in another
state. Pittmanv. Deiter, 10 Pa. D. & D.2d 360 (1957). In Haumschild v. ContinentalCas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959)
the court, in holding that the law of the domicile should control,
stated that the necessity of overruling prior decisions which followed lex loci delicti should not preclude adoption of the better rule
in view of the trend of decisions in this area. Restatement (second),
Conflict of Laws § 390g (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
A recent draft of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws is among
several authorities which can be found in support of this trend.
RESTATmMT, (second), CoN-ucr OF LAws § 390g (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1963). The American Law Institute suggests that whether
one member of a family is immune from tort liability to another
should be determined by the local law of the state of the domicile
when the members have the same domicile. In CooK, LoGcxca. AND
LEGAL BAsis oF CoNrucr oF LAws 249 (2d ed. 1949), Professor
Cook states that once one discards the theory that only the law
where the wrong took place should determine the legal consequence
in an interspousal action, the remaining problem is a question of
domestic relations policy. Therefore, the question is governed by the
law of the state of domicile and not the law of the place of wrong.
There are still strong arguments against the modern trend of
applying the rule of the domicile in determining the rights of the
spouses to sue one another. A North Carolina court held that in
a situation like that presented by the principal case, the crucial
question is not that of the capacity of the spouse to sue, but the
determination of whether she ever had a cause of action. If no
cause of action arose at the place of the wrong there is no right
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for the domiciliary state to enforce. Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609,
129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
A new and different solution was advocated in Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). In this case the plaintiff
and defendant were in an automobile accident in Ontario. Both
were from New York, and the action was brought in New York.
The appellate court reversed a decision based on an Ontario statute
stating that the choice of law should reflect consideration of factors other than where the tort occurred. The court stated that a
"most significant relationship" test should be applied in determining
whether to use the law of the domicile state or the law of the state
in which the tort took place. In criticism of the "most significant
relationship" test, it has been stated that such an approach may be
used by the forum to rationalize the choice of its own law rather
than that of another forum. 19 Arx. L. BEv. supra at 175.
A fourth theory which has been advanced by a group of states
even prior to 1955 is to refuse to follow the lex loci delicti rule on
the ground that it is contrary to the public policy of the forum. West
Virginia follows this theory. In Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187,
179 S.E. 604 (1935), a husband sued his wife in West Virginia for
personal injuries sustained in an accident in Alabama allegedly
caused by her negligent driving. The court, while recognizing lex
loci delicti, stated that it must give way to lex fori when it comes
into conflict with the public policy of lex fori. In Campbell v.
Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960), the court applied
the rule adopted in the Poling case. Michigan and Minnesota are
in substantial agreement. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286
N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744
(1941).
It is difficult to predict which of these views will ultimately prevail in interspousal actions. Although more states are gradually
applying the law of the domiciliary state, the majority of courts
still cling to the lex loci delicti rule. Whether the arguments against
this rule are strong enough to overcome well established precedent
in many jurisdictions is a question that only future decisions can
answer.
Hazel Armenta Straub
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